The Anarchical Society as Futurology by Patomäki, Heikki Olavi
Abstract (Chapter 15) 
The Anarchical Society outlines various possible world orders, such as ‘New Mediaevalism’ 
and world state, as alternatives to the anarchic order of the modern states-system. Chapter 15 
evaluates critically the factual and normative premises of Bull’s arguments concerning 
possible, likely, and desirable future world orders (factual and normative are intertwined but 
not inseparable). A key point is that Bull somewhat underestimated the sway of globalizing 
forces, including the gradual emergence of elements of world statehood. The main argument 
of Chapter 15, however, is that because of his omission of political economy, Bull would 
have been puzzled about the causes of the re-emergence of great power conflicts. For the 
same reason, he also misjudged the importance of building better common institutions. 
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15. The Anarchical Society as Futurology 
Heikki Patomäki 
INTRODUCTION 
The final part of Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society is dedicated to the exploration of 
possible future world orders. First, Bull maps the space of possibilities in conceptual terms 
and then investigates trends towards various possible world-historical ends. He continues by 
normatively assessing alternatives to the states system and especially to what he calls the 
international society. Finally, Bull considers a range of transformative ideologies and their 
plausibility. 
The mapping of future possibilities follows logically from Bull’s theory of world politics 
and its conceptual distinctions. Isolated states can exist without forming a system. Bull’s 
reading of Rousseau comes close to this picture of isolated states. States may also interact and 
be part of a system without forming a society. In this case states and their representatives lack 
intersubjectively shared rules, norms, understandings, and institutions. The third possible 
alternative to the current international society is a world state. Bull’s perhaps most original 
insights concern the case of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty. He calls this future 
possibility ‘a new mediaevalism’. Bull also argues that there are many possible variations 
within the order of international society. The world could become disarmed, ideologically 
homogeneous, and/or based on ‘Grotian’ solidarity. Alternatively, a large number of nuclear 
powers could emerge, generating a universal deterrent system. 
In 2017, we may ask, with the benefit of hindsight, whether Bull’s interpretations and 
expectations succeeded in foreseeing the next few decades of world history and, moreover, 
whether he remains an opportune guide from now on. While Bull represented himself as a 
methodological ‘classicist’, he did not avoid causal language (1966a). From a scientific 
realist viewpoint (Patomäki and Wight 2000; Patomäki 2002), we should also enquire 
whether Bull had an account of the causal powers, mechanisms, and processes capable of 
generating the trends he either observed or anticipated. Can Bull be read as a philosophical 
realist or did he, after all, consider causation in empiricist terms? Can we explicate and then 
assess his implicit premises? What were his typical argumentative schemes? 
An interesting thing about The Anarchical Society is the way it situates normative 
discussions in the context of real world historical developments. The problem with 
conventional Western normative theory is the tendency to either disconnect values from the 
real, geo-historical world or see them in empiricist terms as something that is actually shared 
(Patomäki 1992a; cf. Patomäki 2002, 143–63). Given this, normative theory vacillates 
between irrealist utopianism (when values are sometimes seen as transcendent, i.e. other-
worldly) and mere justification of the present (typically when values are conceived in terms 
of actual tradition or consensus or something similar). 
Bull’s approach is different. His normative judgements are based on a mixture of 
considerations, in which actual, possible, and likely world-historical developments play a 
crucial role. This does not mean, however, that his judgements are always correct or even 
plausible. I will evaluate critically the factual and normative premises of his arguments (the 
two are intertwined but not inseparable). My main argument is that because of his omission 
of political economy, Bull would have been puzzled about the causes of the re-emergence of 
great power conflicts. For the same reason, he also underestimated the importance of building 
better common institutions. 
WORLD-HISTORICAL TRENDS AND TENDENCIES 
How did Bull’s interpretations and expectations succeed in foreseeing the next few decades 
of world history? At first look, Bull seems to have done much better than most in terms of 
anticipating the future. At the general level of systemic transformations, Bull was markedly 
right about the continued existence and prevalence of the international society. The most 
obvious omission was that Bull did not anticipate the end of the Cold War, yet we know that 
it came as a surprise to most IR scholars, Deutsch (1954) being a rare exception (see Allan 
and Goldmann 1992, including Patomäki 1992b, for an ex post evaluation of IR theories in 
this light). It is also noteworthy that in the post-Cold War era, the world has both avoided 
disasters such as a large-scale nuclear war and eschewed systemic changes. 
International society has not degenerated into a Hobbesian system of interactions. 
Ideological tensions were reduced, at least at first, by the unexpected end of the Cold War, 
although new tensions have risen since then. In Bullian terms, the world has experienced a 
return to a pre-First World War situation of largely shared liberal or liberal-authoritarian 
values, although various fundamentalisms have risen to challenge the secular, science-based, 
and materialistic values of the (il)liberal and globalizing capitalism (Ruthven 2007). The 
rules and institutions of international society have not disappeared but evolved; yet a world 
state proper is not in sight. Some of the trends towards a new medievalism have continued, 
but while they may constitute anomalies and irregularities from the point of view of the states 
system, these trends have not outdone the institutions of international society in the post-Cold 
War era, rushed accounts such as Ruggie (1993) and Friedrichs (2001) notwithstanding. 
It may be countered, however, that the European integration process has brought about a 
qualitative change in Europe. In the 2010s, the European Union is a complex hybrid of an 
international organization and a state (Caporaso 1996 is a well-known attempt to theorize this 
ambiguity in terms of different forms of state). Despite the British exit from the Union (due 
by 2019), which reinforces the institution of state sovereignty in Europe, a real doubt persists 
both in theory and in practice as to whether sovereignty lies with the national governments or 
with the organs of the EU. This ambiguity was demonstrated in a particularly authoritarian 
way by the Greek debacle in the summer of 2015. Bull maintained that from a global 
perspective, the EU’s hybrid nature would not make any major difference: 
But such a state of affairs, if it existed in Europe, would not mean that the global 
states system had been eclipsed, only that in this particular area (as, in the early 
centuries of the states system, in Germany), there was a hybrid entity which did 
not conform to the prevailing norms. (1977, 266) 
One could further argue in Bull’s favour that since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, the disintegration of states has halted and the number of states has stabilized. In 
the 2010s, non-state groups engage in violence and state-violence is privatized to a significant 
degree, but from a Bullian point of view, there is nothing radically new either in ‘freedom 
fighting’ or ‘terrorism’, or about mercenaries and trading companies that command armies. 
Trends towards new medievalism have spawned counter-trends. States have continued to try 
to limit and regulate non-state violence. This dialectic has also generated new—even if only 
limited forms—of global governance. (Avant 2016; for a critical discussion, Patomäki 2016). 
What goes somewhat against the expectations of Bull is that since 1977 transnational 
organizations have further proliferated. Bull seems to have underestimated both the sway of 
globalizing forces (Scholte 2005) and ignored the possibility of the emergence of at least 
some elements of world statehood (cf. Albert et.al. 2012; Albert 2016). Transnational 
corporations, banks, and financial investors are arguably more powerful than ever (as pointed 
out already by Gill and Law 1989). New free trade and other international legal agreements 
have consolidated the privileged position of private mega-corporations. Globalization may 
not be as new or discontinuous as sometimes depicted, but qualitative ly novel features and 
properties have emerged, from investment protection clauses and just-in-time systems of 
global production to computerized derivatives markets and aggressive tax planning. These 
trends, strengthened further by processes of technological unification, are perhaps the clearest 
sign of the world system moving towards Bull’s new medievalism. 
Bull did not fully acknowledge that the line between neo-medievalism and a world state 
is necessarily blurred. Concepts are not containers with clear-cut insides and outsides. While 
no proper world state may be in sight, it can be maintained that at least some elements of 
world statehood exist already, involving the possibility of making binding collective 
decisions and creating new law. When the state is understood as a trans-historical universal 
notion, there is no reason to reduce it to one particular instance such as territorial nation-state. 
Different overlapping forms of modern state authority can coexist within the same space. 
True, we may concur that the processes of global constitutionalization may be legitimized 
only partially and are mediated through established territorial states.1 They are also best 
understood in terms of functionally specific global constitutions, in plural, rather than in 
terms of a single overarching formal constitution, even when these processes have deep 
historical roots in pre-modern moral and legal developments. The relevant legal rules and 
principles concern especially human rights and private property rights, but involve other 
tenets as well. (Albert et.al. 2012; Albert 2016; Brunkhorst 2012). 
                                                 
1 Jessop argues that a world state is unlikely to become the dominant scale within any system of 
multi-spatial metagovernance, especially in a networked, asymmetrical, and still hierarchical world 
of states (2012). At the same time, Jessop also maintains that the problematic tendencies, 
antagonisms, and contradictions of the capitalist world markets—which are now ‘ecologically 
dominant’—well justify various political efforts to build a world state. The point of these 
transformative efforts is to ‘limit the ecological dominance of capital accumulation (including its 
increasingly damaging environmental footprint) and provide other ways to steer the overall 
development of world society’ (2012, 202). 
Their inherent limitations notwithstanding, processes of global constitutionalization are 
real and qualitatively different from Bull’s categories of different systems. It is also important 
that the emergence of elements of world statehood has given rise to new forms of agency and 
politics. At least rudiments of global public sphere and an outline of global civil society have 
evolved from the 1980s through to 2010s, as a critical response to global problems and, ever 
so often, in opposition to the evolving neoliberal world order. Sometimes civil society 
organizations advocate liberal human rights and democracy across the world, thus 
contributing to the on-going processes of global constitutionalization. Recurrently civil 
society actors react to global problems and contest the dominant systems of global rule, 
suggesting alternative steering powers, rules and principles, and sources of legitimation, in 
their stead (O’Brian et al. 2000; Scholte 2011; see also Patomäki 2011 on the idea of a world 
political party). 
Hence, while Bull may have been right about the continuing existence and prevalence of 
international society, he seems to have underestimated the sway of deep-seated globalizing 
forces. The increasing power and reach of transnational organizations and the emergence of 
elements of world statehood appear to be to a degree at odds with Bull’s expectations 
concerning possible transformations of the states system. 
What about possible changes within international society? After the end of the Cold War, 
the world became ideologically more homogeneous and, subsequently, there were attempts to 
build systems of collective security or, beyond that, even elements of world statehood in the 
functionally differentiated sphere of security (United Nations 1992). In the absence of 
consensus at the UN Security Council, however, the US and its NATO allies have oftentimes 
resorted to unilateral wars of intervention. As Bull stressed in The Anarchical Society, the 
problem with the accounts of just war is that just causes may and often do clash, whether in 
the public sphere or on the battleground (1977, 30, 132–3, 157–8). This has clearly been the 
case in the Middle East and Central Asia. Bull also stressed that attempts at collective 
security may weaken or undermine ‘classical devices for the maintenance of order’ (1977, 
231). If one great power can resort to war unilaterally, why not the others? The conflict 
between Putin’s Russia and the West can be seen from this perspective as a possible and 
likely consequence of the unilaterally executed version of collective security by the post-Cold 
War US and its allies; this unilateralism has amounted in effect to the revival of the just war 
doctrine. In the Syrian civil war (2011–), too, conflicts over the just cause are interwoven in 
complex ways, with potential not only for some cooperation but also for further escalation of 
antagonisms and conflicts. 
The world has become neither disarmed nor characterized by a universal deterrent 
system. The ‘peace dividend’ of the end of the Cold War turned out short-lived. By 1997-99 
it was over and not only in Europe but globally. In the 2010s, world military expenditure 
exceeds Cold War levels in absolute terms, with East-Asia playing an increasingly prominent 
role (military spending in Asia and Oceania rose by 64 per cent between 2006 and 2015; 
Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016). Nuclear proliferation has nonetheless been slow, slower than 
what many anticipated in the 1960s and 1970s. Underneath sensational media events and the 
daily drama of world politics, and in spite of some gradual changes and persisting potential 
for a global catastrophe, the overall situation in 2017 appears to be mostly that of business as 
usual within the international society setup. This is in line what Bull expected forty years ago. 
BULL’S ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION, SOCIAL 
SCIENCES AND FUTURES STUDIES 
What explains the prevailing or future order or disorder of world politics? Bull’s own 
analyses and anticipations rest on a limited set of argumentative schemes. On occasion he 
made an explicit connection between explanation and causation. Bull (1977, 74–6) clarifies 
that his claims about connections between rules, institutions, and order are causal rather than 
functionalist. He even tries to formulate an account of efficient causation in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions: 
A central theme in this study is that the rules and institutions to which reference 
has been made carry out positive functions or roles in relation to internationa l 
order. In this study what is meant by statements of this kind is simply that these 
rules and institutions are part of the efficient causation of international order, 
that they are among the necessary and sufficient conditions of its occurrence. 
(1977, 74–5) 
Beyond this there is little about causation in The Anarchical Society. In the ‘case for a 
classical approach’, Bull explicates his methodological stance. He gives several reasons for 
the claim that ‘the practitioners of the scientific approach are unlikely to make progress of the 
sort to which they aspire’ (1966a, 369–70).2 Thus instead of relying on quantitative world 
order modelling or any other approach trying to test causal claims in a systematic empirical 
fashion, Bull tries to understand large-scale world-historical developments and their 
implications in qualitative-historical terms. 
Primarily, Bull studies world politics through discussing the relevant literatures. He 
(re)constructs and assesses other scholars’ arguments concerning large-scale developments. 
                                                 
2 It is worth comparing Bull’s proclamation with Vasquez’s (1996) devastatingly critical assessment 
of the main claims and hypotheses of political realism (and to a degree liberalism as an IR theory 
too). Vasquez reaches the conclusion that 93 per cent of political realist hypotheses have been 
falsified and only about 2 per cent passed the test of high association, including those derived from 
the most central realist claims (power, alliances). Those not-yet-falsified will be soon falsified. 
He acknowledges the limitations of making such indirect observations and arguments, 
stressing that our ‘general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative 
and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin’ (1966a, 361). The key notion 
here is judgement. Bull relies explicitly on the exercise of judgement, noting that the most 
important questions are as often moral as empirical-historical. He also makes some logical, 
political theoretical arguments. For instance, he points out that any argument for a world state 
that starts with a Hobbesian description of the states system is incoherent: 
But if states are indeed in a Hobbesian state of nature, the contract by means of 
which they are to emerge from it cannot take place. For if covenants without the 
sword are but words, this will be true of covenants directed towards the 
establishment of universal government, just as it will hold true of agreements 
on other subjects. (1977, 262) 
Bull adds rather categorically, however, that there is no empirical evidence that states would 
be willing to subject themselves to the rule of a world state. Bull did not have the opportunity 
to hear Gorbachev in the late 1980s advocating solutions to global problems by means of 
establishing a world government; neither did he see the literature on global democracy that 
resurged after the end of the Cold War (the debate had of course begun during the world 
wars; see Held and Patomäki 2006). Bull might counter that even if we may now see some 
weak signs of a world state, there is no credible basis for such a global transformation. 
Wishful thinking is not a good basis for rational judgements or actions. Rather, what appears 
particularly important today, in 2017, is that the world is sliding back to nationalist statism 
and conflicts. 
Whether Bull would dismiss the argument concerning overlapping forms of modern state 
authority within the same space, implying that at least some elements of world statehood 
have evolved, is more uncertain. Bull’s scepticism about a world state is based to an 
important degree on normative considerations. At times Bull resorts to conservative remarks 
along the lines of ‘haven’t we already tried all this consciousness-raising stuff’ (1977, 303–
4). His main argument is, however, that a world state in itself would not solve the problem of 
collective violence—or any other global problem. In an argumentative scheme that is 
characteristic to The Anarchical Society, Bull points out that if we can imagine utopian 
possibilities in relation to a world state, we can also imagine them in relation to alternatives 
such as international society: 
Of course we can imagine a world government which would not lend itself to 
civil or internal violence, at least on a large scale, because in it there were 
institutionalised procedures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts that allowed 
for change and were generally accepted as legitimate. Under such a world 
government, as within some modern Western states that have a high degree of 
political stability and a relative absence of violent internal conflict, large-scale 
violence might be avoided for long periods. But if we are free to attribute to our 
imagined alternative form of universal political organisation these utopian 
features, we are also free to think of the states system in these utopian terms, as 
a system in which the conditions of a ‘pluralistic security-community’ are 
generalised. (1977, 285)  
Deutsch and his associates introduced the notion of security community (1957; Lijphart 1981; 
Patomäki 2002, 193–209). Deutsch argued that the existence of the state is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for peace; nor is the non-existence of the state a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for the prevalence of the acute threat of political violence. 
These connections are contingent. The imposition of a common government, with its capacity 
for violent enforcement of norms, may well decrease rather than increase the chances of 
peace. The real difficulty lies in building a community within which conflicts can be resolved 
by institutionalized peaceful means and procedures.3 In this Bull agrees with Deutsch. He 
also uses the same argumentative scheme in the contexts of economic and social justice and 
the environment. In each case, for Bull a world state is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for tackling a global problem. 
Bull’s standard scheme of argumentation is thus abstract and mostly negative. In social 
sciences it is rather easy to say that X is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
outcome O, because strictly speaking nothing ever is (conditions function only as part of a 
geo-historical context). The level of abstraction is too high. Apart from the Deutschian 
mechanism of resolving conflicts peacefully, Bull does not specify any causal powers, 
mechanisms, or processes that we should take into account in analysing specific global 
problems. For instance, he mentions ‘deeper causes’ of economic and social injustice but 
does not explain them (1977, 291). 
Bull was not a positivist, except probably in the sense of legal positivism (following Hart 
2012). On the other hand, whether he can be read as a philosophical or scientific realist seems 
open to doubt. Bull did not have the conceptual resources to resolve the aporia of general 
causal statements vs. historical changes and idiosyncrasies. He criticizes positivism 
(behaviouralism, scientism) in terms of open systems ontology and double hermeneutics of 
social sciences, but at the same time he is rather vague about his own ontological assumptions 
                                                 
3 Neither Deutsch nor Bull explored connections between the possibility of peaceful changes and 
democracy. I have argued elsewhere that democratization of social contexts (including trans- and 
supranational contexts) and the development of security community can be mutually supportive 
(Patomäki 2003). This is not always the case, however. Since the development of a security 
community is a long and complicated process of institutionalization of mutual acceptance, trust and 
procedures and practices of peaceful change, and since it is always vulnerable to the escalation of 
conflicts, an inconsiderate attempt at global democratization may turn out to be counterproductive. 
and existential hypotheses.4 Many of his methodological statements are formulated in an 
imprecise and at times ambiguous manner (see also Bull 2000d). Bull did not develop a 
systematic methodological stance. Kaplan’s criticism of ‘traditionalism’ as ‘undisciplined 
speculation devoid of serious substantive or methodological concerns’ is not entirely 
unfounded (1966, 20). 
ON THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATES 
SYSTEM: A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
Despite the limitations of his approach, it is fair to say that often Bull’s arguments remain 
sound, and many—although not all—of his judgements about possible and likely futures have 
been at least somewhat on the mark. This is in contrast to the bulk of political observers who 
fail miserably with their anticipations and are often bad at updating their beliefs on the basis 
of evidence. Tetlock (2005) uses Berlin’s (1953) metaphor of foxes and hedgehogs5 and 
argues, on the basis of large-scale empirical studies on expert judgements, that foxes over-
predict fewer departures, good or bad, from the status quo. Yet foxes do not mindlessly 
predict continuity from the past. In market terminology, they ‘are hedging their bets’ by 
                                                 
4 It seems likely that he had not heard about the arguments of Harré and Secord (1972), Keat and Urry 
(1975), and Bhaskar (1975), although they were developed and widely discussed in philosophy and 
social theory at the time when Bull was writing The Anarchical Society in the 1960s and 1970s. 
5 Foxes are those who ‘know many little things’, drawing from an eclectic array of traditions. Foxes 
accept ambiguity and contradiction as inevitable features of life. Bull was a fox in this sense. 
Hedgehogs are those who ‘know one big thing’, toil devotedly within one tradition, and reach for 
formulaic solutions to ill-defined problems (Tetlock 2005, 2). 
rarely ruling out anything as impossible. Their strength lies in open-mindedness and 
cautiousness. 
The assumption of business-as-usual works only until things change. A self-critical, 
dialectical style of reasoning can spare experts from many mistakes. Foxes are usually better 
at learning from mistakes. The problem is that too much open-mindedness can amount to 
mere old-fashioned confusion (all possibilities are covered and thus whatever happens seems 
compatible with one’s anticipations). I would characterize Bull as a fox rather than a 
hedgehog, indicating that he was capable of balancing his judgements. Foxes are especially 
sensitive to how forces drawing to different directions often cancel out and result in relative 
stability. 
Bull was less good at explicating how absences and contradictions drive political 
changes.6 It is difficult to analyse the historical dynamics of a system without a sufficiently 
deep account of its underlying structures and mechanisms, or the logics and patterns of its 
evolvement. The mere absence of necessary or sufficient conditions for a particular outcome 
does not explain much, nor does it give a genuine basis for anticipating possible and likely 
futures. Knowledge about history and some casual observations about prevailing trends and 
tendencies may give more substance to one’s judgements, but they are not sufficient for 
building systematic scenarios about possible and more or less likely and desirable futures. 
The fact that there is no organized account of underlying causal powers and mechanisms, of 
relevant contradictions (problems, lacks, etc.), and of related geo-historical processes, means 
                                                 
6 Bhaskar (1993) develops multifarious dialectical categories and schemes for understanding change 
at all levels of reality, but focusing especially on contemporary world history. I apply some of these 
categories and schemes to the analysis of dialectics of global governance in the twenty-first 
century, initially understood in terms of a simple Polanyian double movement, but then developed 
into new and more open-ended and normative directions (Patomäki 2014). 
that judgements about possible futures must be made in part in darkness. What is more, 
Bull’s analysis excludes political economy considerations almost entirely. 
A particularly pertinent question for Bull in 2017 is this: why was the post-Cold War 
moment of cooperation, shared values, and solidarity so short-lived? Why is the world 
sliding, again, back to nationalist statism, militarized conflicts, and arms race, 
notwithstanding the sway of globalizing forces and emergence of elements of world 
statehood? Perhaps the answer can be found, in part, in the dynamics of global political 
economy, which forms a complex process in which actors and issues are actively 
interwoven.7 Politico-economic interconnectedness applies to developments in every region 
of the world, as the dynamic processes of the world economy shape conditions everywhere. 
The whole is more than the sum of its parts; but the whole does not work without its parts. 
Actors do participate in bringing about and steering global political economy processes in 
various ways, but often in short-sighted or contradictory ways (Patomäki 2008; Patomäki 
2013). 
How does the world economy work from a Bullian point of view? It is well-known that 
there is hardly anything about the political economy of peace and security in The Anarchical 
Society. In this rare passage on political economy Bull seems to be committed to the logic of 
economic liberalism: 
                                                 
7 To qualify my earlier remarks on political realism (n. 2), it must be acknowledged that classical 
political realism can illuminate some of the key causes for this regression in world politics in the 
2000s and 2010s. Morgenthau’s systematic critique of the temptation of universalism (1961, 11, ch. 
7, ch. 20, 560–70); and Carr’s (1946, ch. 4.) equally forceful critique of economic liberalism’s 
utopia of harmony of interests; can shed light on the deep structures of meaning that have, once 
again, turned out counterproductive. In a telling phrase, Carr talked about ‘the paradise of laissez-
faire’. 
The states system, it may be argued, obstructs realisation of the goals of 
economic and social justice in two main ways. Because it imposes barriers to 
the free movement of men, money and goods about the earth’s surface—and 
also to their movement according to a putative global plan of economic 
development—it inhibits world economic growth. (1977, 289) 
Bull does not go so far as to say that free trade is good for peace. Rather he is either ignorant 
or agnostic about the debates that concern the institutions and mechanisms of capitalist 
market economy and their internal and external relations to processes such as expansion, 
securitization, escalation of conflicts and preparedness for war. 
Consider the case of the major mid-2010s conflict centring on Ukraine. The immediate 
background for this conflict has to do with NATO and EU expansion eastwards. Russian 
leadership has been progressively more determined to draw a line, especially at NATO, but 
also at EU expansion.8 This is connected to a particular interpretation of political changes in 
the former Soviet Union and the Balkans during the early 2000s. The Russian state-leaders 
have been disposed to interpret the so-called colour revolutions as a deliberate strategic 
means of the expansion of the West and its particular values eastwards. In the words of 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: ‘The US and Europe use the “Color Revolution” to serve 
their own interests, impose their own values, and end in creating new global tensions’ 
(Cordesman 2014). 
                                                 
8 There is a long-standing dispute about whether NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe violated 
commitments made during the negotiations over German reunification. Russian leaders have 
accused the West of breaking promises made after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Der Spiegel argued 
in 2009 that ‘newly discovered documents from Western archives support the Russian position’. 
For a discussion of these documents, see Klußmann et al. (2009). 
The precise extent to which uprisings in the early 2000s in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and 
elsewhere were in fact supported, encouraged, funded or even systematically planned by the 
US and the EU (or its member states) remains disputed. What we know for sure is that the 
securitization of these uprisings on the Russian side have triggered at times rather exceptional 
countermeasures,9 which in turn have led to unintended counterproductive effects, not the 
least in Georgia and Ukraine (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015). In this process of step-by-step 
escalation of conflict, the universalizing inner grammar of Western neoliberalism—
manifesting itself through various free market arrangements, neighbourhood policies, and 
programmes of democracy and human rights promotion—has come to be contested and geo-
politicized, even though Russia itself combines elements of state capitalism and neoliberalism 
in its economic policies and institutional arrangements. 
It is evident that many corporate and state actors benefit (or would benefit) from an easy 
or privileged access to raw materials, cheap labour, industrial capacity or markets in the 
                                                 
9 Already before the 2007–8 elections, there was much public talk in Russia about the danger of a 
‘colour revolution’. Academic analysts have been torn between two different interpretations. Some 
argue that securitization has served Putin’s regime in domestic politics; whereas others think that 
the anxiety of leading Russian politicians is genuine. Duncan (2013) concludes his analysis of 
2007–8 that ‘fear of a coloured revolution was, it seems, not fabricated with the intention of being 
used instrumentally to preserve the regime’. The fear seems genuine, but do the dominant beliefs in 
Russia conflate concerns about ruling elite’s position and the interests of society at large? While a 
nuanced answer to this question lies beyond the scope of my paper, it is worth noting that White 
and McAllister (2014) consider the possibility that Russia only scarcely avoided a ‘Facebook 
Revolution’ in 2011. Given Putin’s popularity in Russia, a ‘revolution’ in 2011 was unlikely. Yet a 
new phase in securitization was reached in 2013–14. Since Ukraine’s EuroMaidan, Russia has 
framed mass anti-regime protests at home and abroad as a military threat. (Bouchet 2016) 
Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, and the Balkans. Constructivists are right, however, in 
stressing that interests are not separate from beliefs but constituted by them (Wendt 1999, 
119-38). Interest-constituting beliefs are frequently disputed. For instance, EU’s democracy-
promotion is built on the neoliberal model of market society. It allows for some pluralism and 
exploration of extra-liberal ideas, and this is what civil society actors often do. And yet, there 
are reasons why ‘all such ideas are swiftly returned to the magnetic field of (embedded 
neo)liberal core assumptions’ (Kurki 2012, 172). Particular beliefs may come to be selected 
and pushed because they accord with the already-constituted powerful interests. Yet political 
economy explanations are not reductionist. They take the concept-dependency of social 
beings seriously. Interests are only moments in social processes. 
Once a particular institutional arrangement is in place, it affects the structuring of 
mechanisms that subsequently tend to bring about particular characteristic causal 
consequences, shaping the processes of global political economy in which actors are active 
and issues are interwoven. Thus the conflict in Ukraine was precipitated by a global crisis. 
The worldwide process of financialization has deepened cycles of boom and bust and made 
them synchronized across the world. The financial crisis of 2008–9 was the most serious 
crisis of the world economy since the Great Depression and the Second World War 
(Patomäki 2010). As a result of the crisis, Ukrainian GDP collapsed by almost 15 per cent in 
2009, ending a decade of high economic growth and decreasing poverty. Following a short-
lived, half-way recovery in 2010–11, recession and then depression continued. Soon Ukraine 
faced a situation of mounting debt and rapid loss of currency reserves. The current account in 
Ukraine reached a record low of –6 USD billion in the third quarter of 2013. At the same 
time, foreign currency reserves were rapidly approaching an all-time record low of 5 USD 
billion. 
European and North American lenders started to assume, or directly demand, austerity. 
The problem is that austerity and financial problems easily become self-perpetuating and 
translate into high levels of unemployment, uncertainties, and economic troubles of everyday 
life. A further problem is that unemployment and economic uncertainties can aggravate social 
antagonisms. Unemployment is an issue of existential security and thus creates room for 
securitization of political issues; this applies to socio-economic uncertainty more generally.10 
In the Ukrainian context, economic hardship is easy to associate with corruption and 
concentration of wealth. 
The Euromaidan protests started in November 2013, when the Ukrainian president 
Viktor Yanukovych began shying away from an association agreement that had been 
negotiated with the EU. Instead, he chose closer ties with Russia. The EU had offered a 
relatively small loan, with conditions similar to the austerity conditions imposed by the 
                                                 
10 The unemployment rate rose to about 10% by early 2014. Unemployment has never been the most 
important source of poverty in independent Ukraine. On the other hand, in 2015–16 the 
unemployment benefit is only about 50 USD per month. While the insecurities related to the threat 
of unemployment are never just economic but also moral and social, this aggravates the threat of 
unemployment. In terms of GDP growth, there was a half-way recovery of the Ukrainian economy 
in 2010–11, but from 2012 to 2015 Ukraine’s GDP contracted again first modestly and then 
sharply. These developments preceded the political crisis associated with the demonstrations and 
riots of late 2013 and early 2014. By the end of 2015 the GDP of Ukraine had contracted back to 
the 2005 level. (World Bank data available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD). 
Troika upon the euro crisis countries.11 Criticism of those conditions fed into the East–West 
and other divides in Ukrainian political economy and society. 
In February 2014, Ukraine appeared to be on the brink of civil war, as violent clashes 
between protesters and special police forces led to many deaths and injuries. Yanukovych 
fled to Russia. He was removed from office by the parliament of Ukraine in a manner that 
violated the then-current constitution. In March 2014, in response to the illegal ousting of 
Yanukovych, the Supreme Council of Crimea organized a referendum in Crimea. The 
majority of Crimean people seemed to favour joining Russia. Hastily Russia made Crimea a 
part of the Russian federation—against international law according to a number of UN 
member states—arguing that the unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008 had 
set a precedent. At this time, pro-Russian movements, involving Russian citizens, were 
protesting against Kiev in Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. In the East the situation 
soon escalated into an armed conflict between the separatist militia supported by Russia and 
the new Ukrainian government. The war in Donbass started in April 2014 and continues as a 
low-intensity conflict in 2017. 
The lessons from the Ukrainian conflict can be generalized from a global Keynesian 
perspective.12 Processes of politico-economic expansion and uneven growth in the context of 
                                                 
11 Austerity tends to depress the economy. These packages also impose retrenchment on public 
services and distribution policies, wage and pension cuts; and impel changing labour laws under 
the euphemism of ‘flexibility’ or ‘flexicurity’—typically, also implying wage cuts, thereby 
lessening citizens’ purchasing power and further reducing overall effective demand. (On the effects 
of the Euro crisis and austerity, see Patomäki 2013, 57–81). 
12 Already Keynes’ own experiences in the 1910s convinced him that economic theories cannot 
adequately be applied solely at national level; a holistic world-perspective is needed. This implies 
that issues of the economy and international relations are tightly interconnected. (Keynes 1920; 
a contradictory and unstable world economy can (co-)generate, (re-)trigger, and escalate 
conflicts that are always embedded in specific geo-historical setting, with complex 
backgrounds. After a point, escalation may start to follow its own logic. A number of 
mechanisms and absences contribute to this outcome. There is no automatic mechanism 
balancing trade, or supply and demand, or synchronizing diverse economic processes. 
Increasing inequalities is an important reason why there may be not only a lack of legitimacy 
but also of inadequate overall demand in the economy. Insufficient demand at home is a 
problem that states can try to export to other states, for instance by means of pushing for 
maximal or privileged access to geo-economic spaces, or by resorting to internal or currency 
devaluation (which lowers the price of exports, making them more competitive in markets, 
but other states can respond in kind). 
When states commit a fallacy of composition in their external policies (i.e. try to 
improve their situation or position by non-generalizable means), they not only reduce 
aggregate demand in the world economy but also risk potential conflicts with other states, 
which may be simultaneously engaging in similar projects. Typically, inadequacies in the 
overall efficient demand translate into the under-utilization of production capacity and thus 
unemployment. Since the 1980s, various forms of precarious work have also become more 
common. High levels of unemployment and uncertainty tend to generate existential insecurity 
among the citizenry, forming fertile ground for the rise of antagonistic self–other relations 
and exclusive nationalism. Capitalist world markets and the states system involve plenty of 
conflict potential. 
                                                 
Markwell 2006) Global Keynesianism is an approach that frames questions of public economic 
policy and politics on the world economic scale (Köhler 1999). 
Many politico-economic processes are self-reinforcing, including processes of 
(de)industrialization and accumulation of wealth and privileges.13 States’ attempts to 
intervene in processes that facilitate or prevent (de)industrialization may be blocked by other 
states, often in the name of free trade. In the 2010s, the principles of free trade are neo-
constitutionally secured (Gill 1998). Attempts to block forms of state interventions in the 
economy can be, and often are, in accordance with the interests of those actors who currently 
benefit from cumulative causation in the world economy (this is the classical, but contested 
Listian argument). 
Also inequalities of income and wealth among individuals and social classes tend to 
accumulate. A key argument of Piketty’s (2014) is that there is a tendency for r > g, where r 
is the average annual rate of return on capital and g is annual economic growth. Past wealth 
becomes increasingly important and inherited wealth grows faster than output and income. If 
this is combined with the inequality of returns on capital as a function of initial wealth, the 
result is an increasing concentration of capital. Moreover, this process is likely to lead to the 
accumulation of political privileges and hence de-democratization. Thereby the concentration 
of capital also shapes the production and distribution of knowledge in society. The selection 
mechanisms for dominant beliefs, narratives and discourses become skewed towards 
reinforcing the appropriate beliefs and societal interests as defined by the wealthy and 
powerful or those representing them. At worst, anything perceived as threatening to basic 
                                                 
13 On the concept of cumulative and self-reinforcing causation in economics, see Kaldor (1972, 1237–
55); and on positive feedback loops and self-reinforcing processes in politics, Pierson (2004). For a 
similar recent analysis of the role of technology gap in trade and uneven growth, see Cimoli and 
Porcile (2011). In Patomäki (2008, 124–55) I analyse the role of positive feedback loops in the 
political economy of global security developments. 
beliefs and stories may come to be securitized; and anyone disagreeing with the established 
direction may be constructed as a potential or actual enemy.14 
These processes matter from the point of view of international and global security. They 
strengthen the relative power of actors predisposed to disregarding those rational economic 
policies needed to ensure full employment and steady economic developments. For instance, 
growing inequalities tend to reduce overall demand and encourage financialization. Thereby 
the likelihood of major economic crises and shocks increases. Moreover, de-democratization, 
securitization, enemy-construction, and inverted totalitarianism (Wolin 2010) are likely to 
generate and aggravate antagonistic relations with different others. The real problem is that 
this trend towards increasing inequalities is difficult to reverse. Historically, only major 
shocks, (especially world wars), interwoven with processes of democratization, have been 
sufficient for invoking progressive taxation and other causally efficacious measures to reduce 
inequalities (Piketty 2014, 18-20, 41, 141, 287, 471, 498–500; Piketty’s argument finds 
support in the history of modern taxation, Scheve and Stasavage 2016). 
                                                 
14 Also NATO’s eastward expansion has been premised on particular but shifting forms and objects of 
securitization. Meanwhile in Russia and Ukraine, the initial private wealth distribution that resulted 
from shock therapy and privatization of the state assets in the early 1990s have been causing 
turmoil and counter-reactions. In most of the OECD world the Pikettyan ‘law’ seems to hold and 
inequalities have been rising gradually. In Russia in the 2000s, Putin’s regime reversed the worst 
excesses of the 1990s and stabilized the socio-economic situation, in the context of solid economic 
growth benefiting also ordinary citizens. Now the Gini index in Russia is roughly on par with those 
of the US, China, and Mexico. See n. 9 for a discussion on how this may have affected processes of 
securitization in Russia. In Ukraine, the Gini index has been lower, but the wealth concentration 
more extreme. 
It is time to return to The Anarchical Society. Bull participated in the problematical 
functional differentiating between domains of security and political economy by focusing on 
diplomacy and statecraft and by ignoring political economy. The progressively ever more 
institutionalized division of labour between security studies and political economy makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to give an adequate account of the causal powers, mechanisms, or 
processes that underlie world-historical trends and tendencies related to peace and war. The 
separation of politics from economics affects one’s judgement about the potential for new 
crises, antagonisms, and conflicts. It also affects our normative judgements about future 
possibilities. The system of states in the capitalist world economy seems increasingly 
dysfunctional. It is widely acknowledged that political economy contradictions are best 
overcome by means of collective actions and institution-building. The process of institution-
building has potential for transforming the very nature of world politics. 
Conclusions 
In the conclusions of The Anarchical Society, Bull states that the overall argument of his 
book ‘is an implicit defence of the states system’, and this concerns especially the elements of 
international society, which should be preserved and strengthened (1977, 218). Going beyond 
mere ‘Grotian’ thinking and international society, Bull also expressed his commitment to 
critical cosmopolitanism: 
World order, or order within the great society of all mankind, is not only wider 
than international order or order among states, but also more fundamental and 
primordial than it, and morally prior to it. The system of states has constantly to 
be assessed in relation to the goal of world order. (1977, 319) 
Normative and empirical claims are interwoven but not entirely inseparable. Despite being 
(usually) a critical cosmopolitan in moral terms, Bull also maintained that claims about the 
actual historical decline of the states-system are unconvincing. This is not the end of Bull’s 
story about the future of world politics, however. Bull stressed that ‘such a conclusion stands 
in need of continual re-assessment’ (1977, 319). 
In this chapter I have provided reasons for a reassessment of Bull’s main conclusion 
about our future possibilities. Bull not only underestimated the sway of globalization and the 
power of transnational organizations but, perhaps even more importantly, his classicist 
methodological orientation kept him away from explicating systematically those causal 
powers, mechanisms and processes that generate events, episodes and trends of world 
politics. Moreover, Bull took for granted the division of labour between security studies and 
political economy and thus underestimated the explosive potential of the states system within 
the capitalist world economy. 
In the 2000s and 2010s, diplomatic discourse has, once again, gradually declined while a 
new geopolitical orientation has gained ground. Both nationalism and military expenditures 
have risen. The problem is that many social processes, also when they originate from 
contradictory rules, principles, and effects, are self-reinforcing. After a critical turning or 
tipping point, the dynamics of a self-reinforcing process, characterized by positive feedback 
to at least some actors, tends to support and institutionalize the original choice or choices. 
Dynamics triggered by particular events or processes at one point in time may reproduce 
themselves or accelerate, even in the absence of the recurrence of the original events or 
processes (Pierson 2004). If positive feedback loops dominate, as they tend to do in global 
political economy, the world may now be heading towards a global military catastrophe. 
Both world history and critical-cosmopolitan normative judgements point towards 
overcoming the states system. Bull’s international institutions have nothing to do with 
economic governance. Political economy contradictions are best resolved by means of 
collective actions and institution-building. We need adequate mechanisms for world 
economic policy and new, well-functioning elements of world-statehood. 
The Bullian perspective makes it difficult to think about forms of agency and strategies 
that could lead to such fundamental transformations. What is more, institutions cannot be 
built without considering their legitimacy. Thus we have to go beyond Bull in engaging with 
world political theory, by opening up questions about global democracy—bearing in mind 
that democracy involves argumentation and debates over the meaning and substance of 
democratic self-determination itself. 
